In the context of a decades-long saga of geopolitical friction, economic sanctions, and military posturing, the immediate trigger for the current standoff between Iran and the United States is a wave of nationwide protests by the Iranian population that erupted on December 28, 2025, sparked by a sharp collapse of the currency (rial) amid hyperinflation, chronic economic mismanagement, and the lingering effects of Western sanctions.
Demonstrations began in Tehran’s bazaars, but quickly spread to major cities like Isfahan, Mashhad, and Tabriz. The regime has labeled demonstrators as “terrorists” and “rioters”, justifying the use of lethal force, while pro-government rallies have been staged to counter the narrative of the protestors. In the wake of the demonstrations, the U.S. President Donald Trump issued public warnings, pledging to “rescue” the Iranian people if the regime continues its crackdown, even threatening a military intervention.
Within the Trump administration and the broader conservative establishment in the United States, some influential figures keep calling for a more aggressive posture toward Iran. A key driver of this push is the U.S.-Israel alliance, which remains a powerful force shaping American foreign and security policy. During his visit to Mar-a-Lago on December 29, 2025, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly emphasized Iran’s efforts to rebuild its military and nuclear capabilities, seeking U.S. support for potential strikes. Pro-Israel advocacy groups in Washington further amplify this pressure, framing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs as existential threats to Israel. How Iran would react to new air strikes by the U.S. and Israel, after the so-called Twelve-Day War (13-24 June 2025)?
IRAN’S RESPONSE OPTIONS
Most Iranian power centers reckon the current crisis as existential, framing it as a Western conspiracy designed to exploit social grievances, overwhelm the security apparatus, and pave the way for regime change through airstrikes. In this context, Iran’s most probable course of action is a high-frequency military response intended to demonstrate resolve.
This scenario would involve measured, direct strikes launched from Iranian territory, similar to the previous retaliation against U.S. bases and Israeli targets. Such a step-up approach enables the regime to appease domestic hardliners and satisfy the demand for dignity of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), while banking on the assumption that a proportional exchange could deter a broader invasion. Iranian leaders may also hope for internal pushback within the U.S. and mediation efforts by regional countries to de-escalate the conflict. The confrontation would likely be short and intense, characterized by rapid, decisive operations rather than a prolonged war, given the significant economic and political constraints on both sides.
Retaliation under this scenario would also involve mobilizing Iran’s network of proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen to project power and strike U.S. military installations and regional energy infrastructure, while avoiding full-scale deployment of Iran’s conventional forces. Hezbollah would concentrate its efforts on Israel, the Houthis in Yemen would likely intensify attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes, and Iraqi militias would target U.S. personnel through localized harassment and launch missiles towards Israel.
The least likely responses involve either extreme passivity or full-scale escalation. The option for Iran to “lay low” and immediately return to negotiations is constrained by the Supreme Leader’s imperative to maintain domestic legitimacy. Amid nationwide protests, appearing weak in the face of foreign aggression could fracture loyalty within the security apparatus. Although Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has signaled openness to “fair negotiations”, the regime’s ideological core perceives current U.S. pressure as a zero-sum game, making silent capitulation virtually impossible.
Conversely, a large-scale retaliation culminating in a sustained regional war is also improbable. Iran’s degraded military capabilities — stemming from an entrenched economic crisis, neutralized air defenses following the 2025 strikes, regime change in Syria, and the decimation of Hezbollah’s major material and human assets — limit its capacity for prolonged conflict. While Tehran may threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, a move that could disrupt nearly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade, such an action would alienate remaining partners like China and likely provoke the very regime-ending ground invasion Iran seeks to avoid.
SCENARIOS FOR ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT
Israel’s role in this standoff will most probably not be strictly defensive. It will rather be integrated into the U.S. strategic planning. One major factor for the Israeli decision-makers will be whether Iran will actually strike Israel directly. It is highly likely that Israel would participate in a strike even if Iran does not hit them first, as the Israeli security establishment views the current Iranian internal weakness as a strategic window to finalize the neutralization of the regime’s ballistic capabilities.
Israel would likely pursue a multi-front strategy combining coordinated strikes with the U.S., cyber and covert operations, and regional proxy targeting. The cyber and covert operations could include advanced cyberattacks alongside sabotage missions and targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists and IRGC leadership. It is also expected that the strikes on Iranian proxies and assets across Lebanon and Yemen will intensify. Iraq will also be targeted in case the U.S. or the Israelis identify signs for any military actions by Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units.
As a less likely scenario, Israel could opt for a symbolic strike on a single high-value target to signal resolve without committing to a full-scale campaign. While this approach minimizes escalation risk, it is unlikely to deter Iran.
MOST LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT
The most probable trajectory for a renewed U.S.-Iran confrontation remains a short, intense conflict followed by a volatile and uncertain period for Iran and the region. The regime faces severely constrained options in the event of U.S. military action. If they opt to absorb strikes without significant retaliation, it risks accelerating domestic pressure. Hardline elements within the Revolutionary Guard and other radical power centers could exploit the ensuing social unrest and perceived weakness to challenge or unseat the current political leadership.
Conversely, if Iran chooses to retaliate, it is unlikely to withstand sustained combined U.S.-Israeli military pressure. Iran’s conventional forces and air defenses were significantly degraded during the June 2025 conflict, limiting its ability to mount an effective, prolonged defense or counteroffensive.
Retaliation would likely invite overwhelming escalation, further eroding the regime’s position. Both sides are bound by strategic caution. The stated U.S. objectives are centered on pushing for a change in the regime’s behavior, short of pursuing full-scale regime change or occupation. This limited scope aligns with the Trump administration’s approach, which prioritizes decisive but contained actions over open-ended commitments. Meanwhile, the Iranian leadership fears for its survival amid economic collapse and mass demonstrations, while the American MAGA base remains deeply opposed to “forever wars”, nation-building, or large-scale military entanglements that could drain U.S. resources.
The only pathway to de-escalation acceptable to the U.S. would likely require Iran to make major concessions, namely ceding greater control over its natural resources (particularly oil and gas), halting nuclear enrichment, or curbing proxy activities. Such a capitulation would signal the regime’s effective collapse in the eyes of hardline nationalists and IRGC factions, potentially triggering internal power struggles or a nationalist backlash against perceived surrender.
This dynamic mirrors Trump’s strategy toward Venezuela: rather than outright dismantling the regime, Washington has sought to force behavioral change through maximum pressure, sanctions, and targeted military action, while leaving room for internal actors to realign with American interests. In a similar vein, the U.S. under Trump appears confident in its leverage but prefers a form of “decapitation” or managed transition, weakening the current clerical leadership without assuming responsibility for post-regime stabilization. As long as a viable faction within Iran’s elite (potentially pragmatic elements willing to negotiate) pledges to deliver U.S. priorities (energy security, reduced regional threats, and nuclear restraint), Washington would likely avoid a prolonged conflict or the creation of a dangerous power vacuum. Such a vacuum could invite exploitation by regional rivals like Russia, China, or even non-state actors, which is an outcome that the U.S. seeks to prevent given its focus on energy dominance and avoiding deeper Middle East commitments.
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Iraq represents the most vulnerable theater in this scenario, functioning as a secondary battleground. Pro-Iran elements within the PMF would almost certainly target U.S. interests and, where strategically feasible, Israeli territories and linked assets. With approximately 2,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in Iraq, these forces would be exposed to significant risks from rocket attacks, UAV strikes, and sustained harassment operations against their installations. The Iraqi government would likely face a state of functional paralysis, caught between the influence of PMF-aligned politicians within the governing coalition and the sovereign imperative to curb anti-U.S. operations to avoid civil conflict. Any failure to act would likely invite U.S. retaliatory strikes and economic sanctions. Furthermore, Iraq’s structural dependence on Iranian electricity and natural gas imports would compound its economic vulnerability. In this deteriorating security environment, formal domestic efforts to expedite the expulsion of U.S. forces from the country would likely accelerate.
In Syria, such an escalation would severely strain the fragile post-Assad government and its volatile stabilization efforts. Despite the fall of the previous regime, Iranian-aligned dormant cells likely remain embedded and could mobilize for insurgency-style operations against the current pro-U.S. government and the hundreds of U.S. troops stationed in northeastern Syria. This activity would almost certainly invite a sustained pattern of Israeli airstrikes within Syrian territory.
Jordan represents a quiet but high-stakes front in a potential U.S.-Iran confrontation. Tehran has explicitly signaled that any country used as a platform for U.S. strikes will be considered a legitimate target. Hence, the U.S. military bases in the Kingdom are viewed as legitimate targets by Iran and its proxies, exposing critical logistics hubs and training sites to rocket and UAV threats. The Jordanian government may also face acute political pressure from a domestic population sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and hostile to the U.S.-Israel alliance. Economically dependent on U.S. aid and regional stability, Jordan possesses limited policy flexibility amid refugee pressures and the necessity of border security. Likely implications include Jordan trying to restrict U.S. use of its territory, heightened force protection requirements, and potential airspace advisories that would underscore Jordan’s role as a critical yet vulnerable U.S. logistics partner.
The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) face elevated risks to critical oil infrastructure, U.S. military installations, and maritime security. In Saudi Arabia, high-value targets such as processing facilities, oil terminals, refineries, and pipelines remain vulnerable to Iranian or Houthi retaliation. Riyadh’s improved relations with Tehran necessitate a delicate balancing act, as the Kingdom seeks to avoid direct confrontation while maintaining its security alliance with the U.S. Similarly, the UAE — a global logistics hub hosting U.S. forces – faces significant risks to its air bases and ports, a situation complicated by its backing of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council, which diverts focus from Iranian threats. U.S. military installations in Qatar are a probable target, creating a strategic dilemma for Doha given its relatively pragmatic ties with Iran. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman also share these vulnerabilities due to their proximity to Iranian naval forces and their varied U.S. military presences. While prolonged damage to oil infrastructure remains less likely unless the escalation spirals, the region would face elevated alert levels, increased naval escorts, and significant spikes in insurance premiums for Gulf transit.
In Yemen, the Houthis would likely intensify Red Sea strikes on international shipping in coordination with Tehran’s strategic signals. By demonstrating long-range anti-shipping capabilities, the Houthis could potentially force the rerouting of Western transit around the Cape of Good Hope, effectively bypassing the Suez Canal. Such actions would trigger intensified multinational naval interception operations. While a sustained closure of the Bab el-Mandeb is unlikely, even episodic disruptions would have significant global trade impacts and raise commodity prices worldwide.
Egypt would face substantial challenges from this spillover, primarily through the impact on the Suez Canal, which handles 12-15% of global trade. Red Sea security risks would lead to high variability in canal transit, directly impacting Egypt’s economic reliance on passage fees. Furthermore, heightened regional tensions would strain Cairo’s diplomatic bandwidth, complicating its mediation efforts in Gaza and delaying the ceasefire arrangements as security concerns take precedence.
Lebanon faces the risk of intensified Hezbollah-Israeli exchanges, with Israel likely expanding its military operations across the country. Such a scenario would amplify the existing political polarization among Lebanese factions, potentially leading to total governmental paralysis. This would halt the government’s ability to advance essential economic reforms or initiate an overdue financial recovery, further increasing the economic and social pressure on Lebanese citizens.
Last but not least, cross-cutting implications include systemic economic shocks, maritime navigation disruptions, and the rerouting of global air travel. Spikes in oil prices would likely trigger global inflation, affecting essential food and energy supplies. Supply chains would suffer from maritime delays, tightened container availability, and elevated freight rates. Additionally, the closure of airspace over Iran, Iraq, Syria, and parts of the Eastern Mediterranean would force the rerouting of global flights between Europe and Asia, adding significant time and cost to international travel while severely restricting regional movement.