The closing months of 2024 and the first half of 2025 catalyzed long-dormant developments in the Middle East region.
In Lebanon, a new head of state was elected after just over two years of vacuum, in the wake of the ceasefire in the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, during which the former suffered heavy blows. President Joseph Aoun secured broad-based support from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the United States, and key European countries. For the first time in years, Lebanon’s political leadership appeared to have a significant degree of legitimacy both domestically and internationally, raising hopes for long-awaited reforms and economic recovery.
In Syria, the fall of Bashar al-Assad led to the establishment of a transitional government committed to stabilizing the country and meeting the expectations for inclusive governance, reconstruction, and regional cooperation, despite its “jihadist” background. Observers cautiously hoped that Syria would not repeat the disastrous post-invasion scenario of Iraq, particularly in avoiding the institutional vacuum and sectarian violence that had plagued the country for years.
At the same time, the re-election of U.S. President Donald Trump came with the intent to re-engage Iran in nuclear negotiations. However, his plan to end the war in Gaza understandably raised polemics and concerns, since it aligned with the ambition of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to occupy the Strip, deport the Palestinian population, and re-establish Jewish settlements in the area.
While still mired in the bloody and destructive confrontation with Hamas in Gaza at the expense of Palestinians’ lives, Netanyahu grew apprehensive of Iran’s attempts to regroup, rebuild, and rearm in what was once the so-called “Shia crescent”. This fear, compounded by the possibility of an unfavorable nuclear deal between Iran and the U.S., pushed Israel to attack Iran directly.
A twelve-day unprecedented war revealed Israel’s overwhelming offensive superiority, especially in intelligence operations, cyberwarfare, and air supremacy. Yet, for defensive coverage, particularly the interception of missile attacks, Israel remained heavily reliant on its allies, chiefly the U.S., United Kingdom, and some Arab countries. Moreover, Tehran was able to hit Tel Aviv as well as other populated areas and strategic infrastructures, provoking casualties and wounded.
Meanwhile, despite the initial wave of optimism, Lebanon remains trapped in political stalemate, hindering both the disarmament of Hezbollah and the implementation of crucial reforms. The country also anxiously watches the possible disintegration of neighboring Syria, a crisis driven by escalating violent sectarianism intertwined with the intense geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Israel.
ISRAEL’S PROJECT
In Israel, Netanyahu has been under major domestic pressure for a long time, with strategic decision-making becoming ever more inseparable from his personal political calculations. Caught between his far-right coalition allies to wipe Gaza out and international criticism, his approach to the conflict with Hamas – marked by objectionable goals, humanitarian catastrophe, and military stalemate – continues to be roundly criticized, even by key figures within Tel Aviv’s military establishment. The sense that Gaza is becoming an unwinnable quagmire further undermined Israeli strategic coherence and reverses the well-known “short war doctrine” that a lot of Israeli veterans do not stop cherishing.
Projects like “David’s Corridor” should not be dismissed as invalid, but are currently impractical due to Israel’s present inability to secure, service, and infrastructure such vast annexations without provoking wider wars and allocating significant resources. On the other hand, such plans are useful as a periodic tool for intimidation.
What many in the region still fail to understand is that the trauma of October 7, 2023, have fundamentally reshaped Israel’s security paradigms. National security is now overwhelmingly defined by the absolute imperative of preventing another similar breach, emphasizing demilitarized buffer border zones with unrestricted freedom of action and movement. This new enhanced security paradigm transcends the traditional political polarization in Israel, which is so ostensible in most other issues, including the justification for a prolonged war in Gaza.
While Netanyahu and his allies advocate for full annexation of the territory and the relocation of its population, more moderate proposals support the idea of a demilitarized Gaza. However, even these moderate approaches often include reconstruction plans featuring buffer zones encircling the Strip, sometimes referred to as a “green belt”. And the purpose of these plans is certainly more security driven than ecological.
Eventually, the same strategy will extend to the West Bank and Jordan’s border. On July 23, Knesset lawmakers voted 71-13 in favor of a non-binding motion in favor of annexing the West Bank.
On the other hand, along the Egyptian border, Israel keeps imposing an unceasing military occupation of the Philadelphia Corridor, in contradiction of the Camp David Accords signed in 1978, despite the symbolic value they hold as the first ever peace agreement with an Arab country.
LEBANON’S PREDICAMENT
In Lebanon, the brief optimism that followed the election of President Aoun has quickly faded, giving way to entrenched political dysfunction. Key national priorities – such as implementing critical economic, financial and fiscal reforms, disarming Hezbollah, and unlocking essential international financial aid – remain stalled.
Despite the severe weakening of its military capabilities, particularly in the South, Hezbollah still wields significant political and social influence in Lebanon. It exploits the fragility of state institutions and strategically leverages existing ceasefire arrangements, citing Israel’s ongoing occupation of five sites in southern Lebanon to justify retaining its arsenal. Hezbollah’s broader strategy includes actively reviving fears of extremist threats, especially from radical groups in Syria, to reinforce its image as an indispensable protector. This narrative is significantly aided by a sophisticated propaganda apparatus, which includes targeted digital campaigns that stoke public fear and strengthen the perception that disarmament is currently unfeasible, inappropriate or counterproductive. Simultaneously, Hezbollah deepens its influence by continuing to embed itself within the Shia community and capitalizing on the state’s persistent dysfunction, solidifying its legitimacy and entrenching its role as a parallel authority.
Israel’s objectives in Lebanon include neutralizing Hezbollah’s missile and drone capabilities, which pose a threat to northern Israeli cities and military operations. Israel also seeks to maintain a 15–20 km buffer zone and full operational freedom across land, sea, and air. However, it shows little interest in dismantling Hezbollah’s broader security infrastructure, provided its offensive capabilities are neutralized. Following the performance of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in southern Lebanon since November 2024, Israel tacitly acknowledges the LAF competence, factoring their presence into its strategic calculus.
Addressing Lebanon’s strategic impasse requires a phased, multi-dimensional approach. Pressuring Lebanese authorities to forcibly disarm Hezbollah without simultaneously providing international support would be a grave error, one that risks igniting civil conflict and derailing the fragile progress initiated in November 2024.
The LAF should stand as a notable exception to the principle of conditional international aid being applied to Lebanon. Although widely respected for their professionalism, the LAF remain severely underfunded. This is largely because international donors have refrained from delivering the promised aid, either because of financial and bureaucratic hurdles or by tying it to broader political reforms, such as resolving the frozen bank deposit crisis, despite the fact that the LAF has no power to influence the reform process. On the other hand, restricting foreign military financing undermines the LAF’s ability to fill the security vacuum in Hezbollah-dominated areas, weakening the only national institution that still enjoys broad public trust.
While some conditionality is appropriate, the LAF’s commendable performance in southern Lebanon suggests this pilot phase can serve as an example for a gradual, nationwide disarmament process, one that would diminish Hezbollah’s military footprint without triggering further instability.
SYRIA’S UNRAVELING?
Syria has re-emerged as a critical nexus of geopolitical competition, primarily involving Israel and Turkey, with significant implications for regional stability.
Turkey views post-Assad Syria as an opportunity to expand its regional influence by consolidating an allied government, establishing border buffer zones, addressing the Kurdish question, and becoming a primary facilitator of Syria’s reconstruction efforts. This aligns well with current U.S. perspectives, but diverges from those of Israel.
Israel’s concerns in Syria extend beyond immediate security. Israel perceives the emergence of a centralized Syrian state, especially one significantly backed by Turkey and the potential establishment of Turkish military installations in proximity to Israel’s border, as an existential threat, fearing a “proxy state” akin to the Iran/Assad era. To counteract this, Israel is subtly encouraging GCC states to engage and pressure the new Syrian leadership, aiming to reduce its dependence on Ankara. However, Turkey’s entrenched influence, encompassing military, intelligence, ideological, and economic dimensions, remains unparalleled.
Primarily, Israel seeks to preserve unimpeded airspace freedom over a weak and disintegrated Syria. Such arrangements are inherently incompatible with the Turkish, U.S., and GCC views of a robust, unified Syrian government and military, particularly one attempting to reconstruct a nation fragmented by 14 years of civil conflict.
In Southern Syria, Israel appears to be adopting a strategy reminiscent of its approach in Southern Lebanon between 1978 and 2000, which involved co-opting local communities in border areas that perceive themselves as persecuted. In exchange for protection and essential services, these communities, often residing within a defined buffer zone, effectively serve as border guards for Israel.
Within this dynamic, the Druze-majority areas of Suwayda have become strategically vital. Israel regards these areas as natural buffer zones, while Sunni Arab tribes, many with Turkish backing, are being mobilized to challenge Israel’s indirect control of Southern Syria. The recent wave of sectarian violence against the Druze, in the wake of the previous massacres in the Alawite and Christian coastal regions, demonstrates how various “jihadist” factions are exploiting identity politics and foreign alliances to consolidate power and secure their relevance within the evolving Syrian landscape.
Consequently, without a formal security agreement between Turkey and Israel concerning Syria, their standoff is likely to persist or even grow, impeding Syria’s recovery and reconstruction. This ongoing instability also negatively impacts Lebanon, whose security and prosperity are closely linked to a stable Syria that facilitates the return of Syrian refugees and where both foreign and Syrian “jihadist” groups are not welcome.
Ironically, while Israel and the U.S. currently have misaligned agendas in Syria, both Iran and Israel effectively find themselves united against the new Syrian regime and Turkey’s expansionist ambitions in the country. In this precarious environment, the potential for Iranian engagement with certain Syrian communities to destabilize the new Syrian government and potentially re-establish a pro-Iranian regime cannot be dismissed. Iran’s historical success in exploiting Sunni grievances in Iraq between 2003 and 2014, which contributed to the rise of ISIS, underscores its capacity for such strategic maneuvering.
IRAN’S RESILIENCE
If there was a moment to significantly degrade Iran’s regional influence without full-scale war, it was mid-2025. At that point, Tehran’s strategic architecture, carefully constructed since 1982, was in total disarray. Hezbollah had suffered severe losses, Assad’s fall severed Iran’s logistical lifeline to the Levant, and its influence in Iraq was effectively neutralized. The asymmetric warfare model that Iran had cultivated – built on proxies, deniability, and territorial proximity to Israel – was crumbling. Even its nuclear brinkmanship appeared to lose credibility in light of growing domestic pressures and the erosion of regional alliances.
Despite this moment of vulnerability, the U.S. failed to act decisively. Warnings from analysts about avoiding an Iraq-style collapse, along with domestic polarization in the U.S. between interventionists and isolationists, led to strategic hesitation. Right after that, an emboldened Iran began to recover lost ground, politically and diplomatically. Domestically, the regime regained legitimacy by framing Israeli aggression as an imperialist overreach. Regionally, Tehran is once again positioning itself to rebuild networks of influence, though likely in new forms and new geographies.
The Houthis in Yemen, Iran’s current main asset, remains active and cost-effective in threatening maritime routes through the Red Sea. Unlike the crumbled Hezbollah-Syria axis, the Houthi threat provides Tehran with an enduring nuisance capability that targets Western economic interests.
U.S. UNDER TRUMP 2.0
Trump’s United States has been oscillating between rhetorical engagement and policy hesitation. Domestic politics, particularly the divide between isolationists and interventionists, has paralyzed decisive action.
A significant generational shift is reshaping Republican views on Israel, particularly among younger conservatives. Unlike older Republicans shaped by historical contexts that fostered strong pro-Israel sentiment, a growing number of young conservatives increasingly perceive Israel as just another ally potentially exploiting American power and generosity. This generational divergence has been deepened by harrowing images from Gaza, including reports of a bombed Catholic church and settler attacks on Christian communities in the West Bank, intensifying resentment within the MAGA base.
With midterm elections looming, direct U.S. military interventions are off the table unless provoked by dramatic escalations. Washington will continue to shield Israel and support its strategic aims, but it will avoid entangling itself in regional wars, especially with Iran.
Tehran has understood this dynamic and is delaying substantive negotiations. Trump, known for transactional diplomacy, might yet settle for a politically expedient agreement. Israel pre-empted this possibility in June 2025 by striking Iranian targets: an act designed to derail any premature deal, echoing Hamas’ October 7 strategy to block Saudi-Israeli normalization. However, the extent to which Israel can continue sabotaging a transactional U.S.-Iran deal is uncertain.
At the same time, the mounting opposition among his supporters to unending financial and military backing for Tel Aviv could prompt Trump to recalibrate his approach to Gaza, in order to prevent his administration from being too closely associated with Netanyahu’s plans for the Strip.
Since October 2023, the MENA region has been undergoing a profound, and potentially lasting, transformation. The rules of engagement are being rewritten not only by states, but also by their proxies, their rivals, and their domestic constituencies. Whether this results in a new regional order or a deeper descent into instability will depend not only on military outcomes, but on the capacity of both local and international actors to balance ambition with restraint, ideology with pragmatism, and expansionism with shared security.